Some thoughts on democracy

On Democracy by Dahl

Dahl explains the construct of democracy in familiar terms one would find in a government class in high school in his text On Democracy. However, his assessment of why and how democracy works or fails globally offers really interesting conditions for consideration by Americans, especially with the backdrop of America’s pursuit to democratize Iraq and other countries around the world.
The United States of America has spent trillions of dollars at this point trying to democratize Iraq. Using Dahl’s lens of favorable and essential conditions for democracy, I am not surprised the war has taken so long and been so difficult. Dahl identifies the following five conditions that favor democracy, labeling the first three as essential: 1. Control of the military and police by elected officials. 2. Democratic beliefs and political culture. 3. No strong foreign control hostile to democracy. 4. A modern market economy and society. 5. Weak subcultural pluralism. An examination of these conditions in regard to what we knew about Iraq’s government and culture prior to the war, clearly reveals that the United States used faulty processes to try to help Iraq escape a tyranny and establish a democracy. Iraq does not have the conditions necessary to sustain a democracy, even if the United States can force it into creating a system that resembles democracy.
Control of the military and police by elected officials. Iraq’s version of the secret police, the Mukhabarat, took direct orders from a dictator, so the country’s chance of instituting democratic practices was slim as long as Saddam Hussein was in power. Hussein was not an elected official held accountable by his people; he was a tyrant and a dictator who silenced opposition and discussion by controlling his military. Our ousting of Hussein and plan to replace his dictatorship with a democratic government was the right step to creating the conditions necessary according to Dahl. However, Dahl does not argue the five conditions need to be established in any order, and the United States had not taken steps to establish the other five conditions necessary for a democracy. Furthermore, one has to look at the essential conditions for democracy (numbers 1-3 above) as a set rather than separate items.
Democratic beliefs and political culture. This essential condition for democracy directly relates to the first in the fact that the political culture in Iraq ran on fear, not ideals. Government officials did what they were told to avoid death, not because they believed they had a voice. This condition reminds me of the social capital one can study in schools. If a school wants to involve its community, it first needs to build trust with the community. The people in the community, if they have not had the opportunity to speak freely, or if they have been like the Iraqis where their lives depend on compliance, will not automatically welcome the chance to make their voices heard. Often schools complain about parental involvement being low, but their systems are set up to intimidate parents and are often just the type of system the parent of an at-risk students struggled to navigate in his/her own education. Similarly, the Iraqis, faced with a new freedom of expression and opinion, will not embrace it without a lot of groundwork first. The United States did not lay that groundwork. When we overthrew Saddam, we had not built the necessary trust with the Iraqi people. They didn’t believe we would help them learn to use their voices without fear. The Iraqi people only knew propaganda. They have never experienced a system with true freedom of expression, speech and press, so they cannot possibly trust that their thoughts will not get them into trouble. Dahl points out that a value in democratic ideals grows slowly, through generations, to become part of a culture. Iraq’s political culture not only lacked democratic ideals, it favored authoritarian rule carried out with fear and coercion. Democracy relies on people being able and willing to stand up and articulate ideas that are then debated. Iraqis never had the opportunity to debate. They either agreed with Saddam, or they were shot.
Not only did the Iraqis distrust our intentions, the world distrusted Iraq because of its clear marriage of church and state. Many countries throughout the world separate the church and the political institutions. They do not look favorably on the Middle-eastern countries that incorporate Islamic principles into their social and political policy, and Dahl’s third essential condition for democracy is: No strong foreign control hostile to democracy. The Middle-eastern countries have long been lumped together by many citizens of the world because they are all from the oil-producing nations. Even though the countries and even regions within the oil producing countries vary quite a bit, most of the world tends to still stereotype countries that are predominantly Islam as countries that not only dislike western ideals, but are breeding grounds for terrorists who want to destroy democratic countries. We also consider that region hostile to democratic ideals because they do not treat all their citizens equally. Within their religious and political policy, gender inequities exist that rub Americans and other democratic peoples the wrong way. Iraq had not indicated it planned to change its Islamic, Middle-eastern lifestyle or government if we helped remove Saddam.
The most dramatic problem Iraq faces is its lack of one of Dahl’s favorable conditions: Weak subcultural pluralism. Iraqis are clearly divided between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. The Sunni and the Shiites, although both Islamic, have been sharply divided since 680 when they argued about a question of leadership of the faith. Even though the Sunni are the minority population in Iraq, they are much more powerful than the Shiite. The elite Sunni, also discriminate against the Kurds, which in reality are also Sunni. These cultures are not only divided ideologically; they are divided regionally. These strong cultural divides make democracy difficult, especially representative democracy. The Sunni leaders are not going to want to give up control to make the country representative. So while the United States had good intentions, it did not consider the depth of hatred and bias these cultures feel toward each other. They should have examined the fact that no matter how many times we try to bring similarly estranged cultures to a compromise, it often does not last. Just look at the Israelis and Palestinians.
Finally, Dahl says a modern market economy and society is a condition that favors democracy. This condition is a bit perplexing because one would think a modern market system would be in direct opposition to democracy. Dahl says, “a market-capitalist economy seriously impairs political equality: citizens who are economically unequal are unlikely to be politically equal,” (158). However, he says democracy and market-capitalism are in an antagonistic symbiosis. He notes that polyarchal democracy has only lasted in countries with a market system. He also notes that economic growth is favorable to democracy because it helps a country reduce poverty and provide better living standards, in effect reducing economic and political conflicts. He also points out the way market-capitalism can harm democracy because each limits the other from reaching its ideal. Iraq’s powerful role as one of the world’s oil producing nations makes one consider it a market economy. But in reality, there is no equivalent to the American Dream in Iraq because the cultural barriers and corruption at the highest levels prohibit a truly free market.
The United States had good intentions. Dahl cites several times we have tried to force democracy on countries when they were not ready. Unfortunately, the United States is not setting the groundwork to make conditions favorable for democratic reform in many countries around the world. In order to really help countries become democratic, we must be patient and help their people set up the conditions necessary for true reform.